The marginality of poetry in American culture has been taken for granted at least since the dawn of the modernist period, when Walt Whitman printed his first volume of poetry at his own expense. More recently, it has become an article of faith that there is a real popular audience for poetry, but somewhere else-in the East. Literary journals, the popular press, and publishers have made household names of a handful of Eastern European writers: Czeslaw Milosz, Joseph Brodsky, Zbigniew Herbert. (...) One is regaled with chestnuts about ordinary people in the Eastern bloc who care about "the Word," manuscripts passed from hand to hand, even poems preserved orally. Inevitably, the questions are revived: Where are the great American poets? Has American poetry been reduced to private confessions and personal trivia? Why is it that our poetry lacks that public, political relevance? The answer to such questions is often that we do not have the weight of History on our backs, the state oppression under which, as Milosz says, "poetry is no longer alienated," no longer "a foreigner in society," and can become more important than bread.1 But what has not surfaced in the vaunted "poetry and politics" debate is the extent to which our homage to victims of censorship everywhere has become a fetishization of totalitarianism, and a self-serving one at that. The mythology of our freedom, unbounded and unmediated, depends precisely on this other world, on what happens over there. 1. Czeslaw Milosz, The Witness of Poetry , p. 95; hereafter abbreviated WP. Bruce F. Murphy's work has appeared in the Paris Review, Pequod, and An Gael. He has completed a manuscript of poems and with Friedrich Ulfers is writing a study of Friedrich Nietzsche. (shrink)

In the opening chapter of this groundbreaking work, Bruce Kawin asks: can a film which is already the dream of its maker and its audience, and which can present itself as the dream of one of its characters appear, finally, to dream itself? Contrary to the classic assumption that all film narration is third person, the author contends that a movie can be narrated in first person through a consciousness that originates either on screen or off. Through a discussion (...) of Keaton, Welles, Resnais, Bergman, Godard, and even Chuck Jones, Kawin shows how the self-reflexivity of film stimulates the aesthetic, political, and psychological processes of the audience, making possible a greater knowledge and acceptance of ourselves.". (shrink)

“… the recipients of this letter had to learn that while Christ is unchanging, he is nevertheless onward-moving, always leading his people forth to new ventures in his cause…. He is the pioneer, the trailblazer, along the path of faith….”.

For Paul and Luke alike, the present age is the age of the Spirit; for them both, the presence and activity of the Spirit constituted the great new fact of their time.

Positive transcription elongation factor b (P‐TEFb), which comprises cyclin‐dependent kinase 9 (CDK9) kinase and cyclin T subunits, is an essential kinase complex in human cells. Phosphorylation of the negative elongation factors by P‐TEFb is required for productive elongation of transcription of protein‐coding genes by RNA polymerase II (pol II). In addition, P‐TEFb‐mediated phosphorylation of the carboxyl‐terminal domain (CTD) of the largest subunit of pol II mediates the recruitment of transcription and RNA processing factors during the transcription cycle. CDK9 also phosphorylates (...) p53, a tumor suppressor that plays a central role in cellular responses to a range of stress factors. Many viral factors affect transcription by recruiting or modulating the activity of CDK9. In this review, we will focus on how the function of CDK9 is regulated by viral gene products. The central role of CDK9 in viral life cycles suggests that drugs targeting the interaction between viral products and P‐TEFb could be effective anti‐viral agents. (shrink)

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list (...) of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules. (shrink)

This book applies Augustine's thought to current questions of teaching and learning. The essays are written in an accessible style and is not intended just for experts on Augustine or church history.

Reason and Rationality in Health and Human Services Delivery is the first book to discuss the topic of decisionmaking and services from a multidisciplinary approach. It uses theory and social considerations, not just technology, as a basis for improved services. Health and human service students and professionals will learn how to form rational and reasonable decisions that take their clients'cultural backgrounds into consideration when identifying an illness or appropriating any kind of intervention. With a particular emphasis on theories, models, organizational (...) settings, technologies, and practitioner training methods that lead to culturally sensitive decisions, Reason and Rationality will help you deliver efficient and improved medical and social services to clients from all ethnic backgrounds. Recognizing reason as the centerpiece of most of Western philosophy, this text reveals how our idea of truth, fact, and order are wrongly thought to be universal; yet, Western principles are continually used in the decision-making process for health and social services. Focusing on the policy implications of decisionmaking in medical and social service settings, this text works to incorporate a broad range of factors into the reasoning process, such as cultural traditions and beliefs, that will result in better treatment for patients. Giving you suggestions and strategies for upgrading reasoning and decision-making processes and applying them to every area of service, Reason and Rationality discusses different themes that will help you improve services to patients, such as: the rationale currently used to justify decision-making strategies concerning medical and human services using computer technology to make clinical assessments revising administrative structure, management theories, and organizational strategies so that decision-making processes enhance the overall quality of service delivery how the practitioner/patient relationship is important in choosing the proper treatment soliciting community-based input to assess the public's health and human service needs in order to lessen political involvement in decision-making stages In addition, Reason and Rationality provides information and examples that show why you should consider the "life-world"--the values, beliefs, and commitments of a culture's history-- as the key to understanding the powers of reasoning that specify parameters of health and illness. (shrink)

Some commentators argue that conception constitutes the onset of human personhood in a metaphysical sense. This threshold is usually invoked as the basis both for protecting zygotes and embryos from exposure to risks of death in clinical research and fertility medicine and for objecting to abortion, but it also has consequences for certain religious perspectives, including Catholicism whose doctrines directly engage questions of personhood and its meanings. Since more human zygotes and embryos are lost than survive to birth, conferral of (...) personhood on them would mean – for those believing in personal immortality – that these persons constitute the majority of people living immortally despite having had only the shortest of earthly lives. For those believing in resurrection, zygotes and embryos would also be restored to physical lives. These outcomes do not mean that conception cannot function as a metaphysical threshold of personhood, but this interpretation carries costs that others do not. For example, treating conception as a moral threshold of respect for human life in general, rather than as a metaphysical threshold of personhood, would obviate the prospect of the afterlife being populated in the main by persons who have never lived more than a few hours or days. (shrink)

The value of extending the human lifespan remains a key philosophical debate in bioethics. In building a case against the extension of the species-typical human life, Nicolas Agar considers the prospect of transforming human beings near the end of their lives into Galapagos tortoises, which would then live on decades longer. A central question at stake in this transformation is the persistence of human consciousness as a condition of the value of the transformation. Agar entertains the idea that consciousness could (...) persist in some measure, but he thinks little is to be gained from the transformation because the experiences available to tortoises pale in comparison to those available to human beings. Moreover, he thinks persisting human consciousness and values would degrade over time, being remade by tortoise needs and environment. The value available in the transformation would not, then, make the additional years of life desirable. Agar’s account does not, however, dispose of the tortoise transformation as a defensible preference. Some people might still want this kind of transformation for symbolic reasons, but it would probably be better that no continuing human consciousness persist, since that consciousness would be inexpressible as such. Even so, it is not irrational to prefer various kinds of lifespan extension even if they involve significant modifications to human consciousness and values. (shrink)

Robinson argues that by certain threshold criteria, pregnant women qualify for a higher moral status by reason of their pregnancies. While her intention is to make this a status upgrade for women, we worry that it may result in a status downgrade for women as a class, by presupposing and reinforcing women’s value in relation to their reproductive labour. Historically, central to feminist analysis is resistance to reductive accounts of women in relation to their reproductivity. For example, de Beauvoir addressed (...) men’s transcendence and contrasted it with women’s immanence, a status distinction possible because women are mired in expectations that they will marry, produce children and remain in the domestic realm; and for her part, Firestone argued that biological reproduction underlies women’s inferiority to men and that ‘The reproduction of the species by one sex for the benefit of both (should) be replaced by…artificial reproduction’1 2 Her concern was to liberate women from expectations of biological reproduction so their productive value in society is not reduced to their reproductive contributions. A formidable body of analysis in this same vein cautions against collapsing the value of women into their pregnancies, so much so that some commentators even distinguish ‘mothering’ from gestation.3 Robinson’s argument that pregnant women qualify at a higher threshold of personhood emphasises …. (shrink)

Editors provide a substantive introduction to the history and theories of perfectionism and neutrality, expertly contextualizing the essays and making the collection accessible.

ABSTRACT In this essay the argument set forth by Michael Levin regarding the abnormality of homosexual behaviour is reviewed and criticized. Against his argument which holds that homosexual behaviour is abnormal because it constitutes an evolutionary aberration, I argue that Levin's and all similarly constructed arguments fail to show that evolutionary origins of sexual behaviour have any significant normative force. I contend that his notion of homosexuality is confused and that he fails to consider alternative methods of how homosexuality might (...) have indeed served evolutionary adaptive purposes or been the result of surplus adaptations. I argue, too, that Levin's linking of unhappiness with homosexual behaviour is spurious and ill‐supported. Consequently, I reject Levin's claims that public policy ought to do what it can to minimize the incidence of such behaviour. I argue by contrast that if happiness is the end of public policy decisions, then society ought to take what measures it can to protect persons in respect of their homosexual behaviour and identities. (shrink)